By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)

I write as someone who has followed the Safe Schools idea from Chibok to the latest mass abductions, and as a member of the Safe Schools Community of Practice/Partnership Alliance for Safe Schools (PASS).

The painful truth is this: on paper, Nigeria is a Safe Schools champion; in reality, children and teachers are still being hunted.

1. WHAT SAFE SCHOOL WAS SUPPOSED TO MEAN

After Chibok in 2014, Nigeria launched the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) with an initial $10 million pledge, later expanded to a multi-donor trust fund coordinated with the UN. Nigeria then advanced its commitments:
▪︎Endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) in 2015
▪︎Ratified the SSD in 2019
▪︎Hosted the 4th Global SSD Conference in Abuja
▪︎Adopted the National Policy on Safety, Security & Violence-Free Schools (2021)
▪︎Approved Minimum Standards for Safe Schools
▪︎Launched the National Plan on Financing Safe Schools (2023–2026) — a N144.8bn plan targeting at-risk schools
▪︎Save the Children developed the SSD Training Manual for Nigerian security agencies, strengthening the capacity of the military, police, DSS and NSCDC to protect education facilities and prevent military use of schools
▪︎UNICEF supported the development of school-level Early Warning Systems (EWS) in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Niger and Zamfara, producing risk-detection and reporting models that should have been scaled nationwide.

On paper, this is an impressive architecture.
But on the ground, Nigerian schools remain desperately vulnerable.

2. REALITY: NIGERIA IS STILL CLOSING SCHOOLS AFTER EVERY ATTACK

Despite all the frameworks and global endorsements:
▪︎Hundreds of schools in the North-East and North-West remain shut
▪︎Over 1 million children did not return to school in 2021 out of fear
▪︎2020–2024 saw serial mass kidnappings in Niger, Kebbi, Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara
▪︎In 2025, the cycle continued with new mass abductions and new statewide school closures

Clearly, Safe Schools has not yet made schools safe.

3. THE ABUJA SYNDROME — A Safe Schools Architecture That Exists in Abuja, Not in Schools

In my opinion, Safe Schools in Nigeria has remained largely a slogan, not a functioning safety system.

For a decade, we have witnessed:
▪︎High-profile launches in Abuja
▪︎“Special Safe School Squads” announced
Joint Operations Centres commissioned
Workshops, vests, banners, speeches and TV cameras.

But the reality in rural and peri-urban schools — where attackers strike — is very different.

At the school level:
There is no functional early warning system (EWS) in most schools.

The UNICEF-supported EWS pilots in five states remain isolated pilots, not a national system.

Most schools lack Emergency Response Plans for their terrain or threat profile.

No evacuation or lockdown drills are conducted.

School security personnel are still overwhelmingly ‘Baba Maiguard’ — elderly, untrained night watchmen, unarmed, unequipped and unable to delay attackers for even five minutes.

Neither teachers nor students are trained in emergency procedures.

Communities lack structured reporting pathways to security agencies.

States continue to establish schools in ungoverned areas

In short: we built a Safe Schools structure at the federal level, but not a Safe Schools system at the school level.

4. A GOVERNANCE MISTAKE:

Safe Schools Is Anchored in the Wrong Ministry. Globally — in Kenya, South Africa, Norway, Indonesia, the U.K. — Safe Schools programmes are education-led:
– Education Ministries lead
– Security agencies support
– Finance ministries fund
But Nigeria reversed this logic.
By anchoring Safe Schools under the Federal Ministry of Finance, the country created a programme treated as a budgeting/procurement exercise, not an operational school-safety system

– Fragmented implementation across Police, NSCDC, DSS, Defence HQ
– Weak leadership from the Federal and State Ministries of Education
– No single national Safe Schools “Commander” with authority

This bureaucratic misplacement is a major reason why policy has not translated into protection.

5. UNDERFUNDING AND THE ILLUSION of READINESS

The National Plan on Financing Safe Schools (2023–2026) costs N144.8bn, yet the 2023 budget released less than half of the required funding.
– State co-funding is inconsistent
– Donor support remains supplemental, not foundational
– Many high-risk LGAs lack predictable Safe Schools financing

The result is:pilot projects, ceremonial visits, workshops, a few model schools,
but no nationwide protection.

6. FOCUS ON FENCES, NOT INTELLIGENCE, ROUTES OR RESPONSE

Many “Safe School compliant” institutions have new paint, a gate, a fence, a signboard, a couple of guards.

But this is cosmetic. Bandits are not deterred by signboards or walls.

What is missing:
1. Intelligence-led early warning
2. Safe routes for learners
3. Rapid response coordination with security agencies
4. Twice-termly emergency drills
5. Trained school safety officers
6. Community surveillance networks
7. Emergency communication systems

Physical structures without operational capacity are useless.

7. SAFE SCHOOLS CANNOT WORK WHERE THE STATE HAS LOST TERRITORIAL CONTROL

No school in Nigeria can be safe if its surrounding LGA is insecure. Safe Schools cannot succeed where police presence is thin, bandits move freely, response times are slow, communities are unprotected.

School-level measures cannot compensate for territorial insecurity.

8. WEAK DATA, WEAK ACCOUNTABILITY

Nigeria still lacks:
– a centralised database of school attacks
– a public Safe Schools compliance map
– routine audits of Safe School spending
– annual state-by-state Safe School scorecards

Without data, you cannot enforce accountability. Without accountability, implementation collapses. Without implementation, children remain unsafe.

9. THE CORE PROBLEM SUMMARISED

Safe Schools in Nigeria suffers from:
a. strong declarations but weak implementation
b. impressive Abuja activity but weak school-level continuity
c. fragmented leadership. Who leads? Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Education?
d. misaligned governance
e. insufficient funding
f. absence of drills
g. weak EWS
h. poorly trained security personnel
i. lack of community engagement
j. no nationwide monitoring and evaluation
k. Weak participation by some states
This is why Safe School is not providing safety for schools.

10. WHAT MUST CHANGE

For Safe Schools to become real:
1. Place leadership back under the Ministry of Education, supported by Police, DSS, NSCDC and Defence HQ.
2. Fully fund the National Safe Schools Plan and ring-fence funds for high-risk LGAs.
3. Establish a National Safe Schools Operations Command with unified authority.
4. Scale the UNICEF EWS pilots into a nationwide early warning architecture.
5. Mandate school emergency drills every term.
6. Replace ‘Baba Meguard’ with trained, certified school safety officers.
7. Publish a real-time national Safe Schools compliance map.
8. Integrate Safe Schools into the National Security Emergency Response Framework.
9. Make school safety a core KPI of police and intelligence agencies.

CONCLUSION

The founding idea of Safe Schools is simple: even in conflict, education must not die. Schools should be the last spaces to fall — not the first to be shut.

But until Safe Schools becomes school-led, security-backed, community-rooted and fully funded, Nigeria will continue launching programmes in Abuja while children in rural areas face the terror of abductions.

That is why the question persists: Why is Safe School not providing safety for schools in Nigeria?

The honest answer is:Because Nigeria built a Safe Schools framework on paper — not a Safe Schools reality on the ground.

● Group Captain Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd