By Brig Gen PTO Aro (Rtd)
In national security discourse, nothing is more dangerous than emotion parading as analysis. Moses Oludele Idowu’s “Generals Without Shame” is a classic example of such misguided critique: a volatile cocktail of sweeping generalizations, historical cherry-picking, flawed comparisons, and strategic ignorance, with due respect to his scholarly background.
The entire piece rests on one shaky assumption: that a General being kidnapped and his peers contributing to his release through ransom is proof of a failed military system and a dishonourable officer corps. But that conclusion, while emotionally satisfying to some, collapses under the weight of reasoned analysis, from those that understand the concept of military operations.
I would like to start with his first and most basic flaw based on my military knowledge . That is confusing strategy with tactics.
A general, by training and responsibility, is not a tactical warfighter. Strategy resides at the general level; tactics and operational execution are the duties of Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Captains. Comparing a general’s role with that of a commando team leader is comparing apples with oranges. The Israeli officers he cited, Yoni Netanyahu, Guy Jacobson, Ariel Sharon in his early days, operated at the tactical level. Their heroism in specific missions does not invalidate the strategic decisions taken by their generals. Sharon himself later became a general and a politician. But let us not forget, Israel’s military culture, doctrine, and political realities are vastly different from Nigeria’s.
Second, Idowu completely ignores the context of asymmetric warfare. Nigeria is not fighting a standing army, it is fighting fragmented cells of criminals, terrorists, and ideological extremists embedded within civilian populations and often protected by the same communities they terrorize. Even the United States, with all its intelligence and might, failed to eliminate the Taliban after two decades and trillions of dollars. Yet, he expects Nigeria’s overstretched security agencies to perform miracles overnight. This is not an army problem, it is a systemic national failure that includes politics, intelligence, community cooperation, and social trust.
Thirdly, I will talk about the ransom issue. Paying ransom is not a badge of honour. It is a last resort when no viable tactical solution exists without risking the life of the hostage. And yes, sometimes ransom is paid quietly even by nations he glorifies. Israel, the U.S., and France have all either paid or facilitated payments for hostages, despite publicly denying it. The difference is, they manage the narrative better. If a group of officers decided to privately contribute to rescue one of their own when institutional efforts were constrained, that is loyalty, not cowardice.
Fourth, the idea that Nigeria has too many generals and therefore they are all incompetent is weak logic at best and deceptive at worst. Numbers do not equate to quality, but they also do not negate it. Promotion structures, force sizes, political transitions, all affect the generals population. If you want to question the quality of training or promotion systems, fine, but to generalize that “generals are now just pensioners with titles” is to mock men who served under harsh and evolving conditions, such as my humble self. Some of colleagues have bled for this country.
Fifth, he picks historical anecdotes without acknowledging their complexities. Yes, Ariel Sharon pursued terrorists across borders. But Israel had the legal framework, the intelligence coordination, and most importantly, the political will. Nigeria operates in a murky political and ethnic minefield, where actions against terrorists in one zone are quickly painted with ethnic or religious colouration in another. That’s a reality Mr. Idowu conveniently ignores.
And here lies a profound irony. Nigeria, with all its internal contradictions, remains one of the few nations in the world that has successfully deployed its military into two sovereign nations: Liberia and Sierra Leone, under hostile and complex environments and stabilized both. Not just tactically, but strategically. ECOMOG, largely under Nigerian leadership, turned around civil wars, restored democratic governments, and left a legacy of peace. These are not achievements of “generals without honour”, these are feats only possible through skillful command, multinational coordination, and the sacrifice of Nigerian soldiers and officers, many of whom paid the ultimate price. Where was the global community then? Nigeria did the job. That is honour. That is legacy.
Sixth, his tone is designed to provoke, not to enlighten. The goal seems not to offer constructive criticism but to shame, to mock and to belittle. His obsession with humiliation (“generals kneeling to beg majors,” “generals picked off like ripe cherries”) serves no purpose beyond feeding public outrage. That is not patriotism. That is opportunism.
And finally, while it is tempting to invoke nostalgia for the so-called golden age of “no-nonsense” generals like Murtala or Abacha, we must not rewrite history. Abacha ruled by fear.
In summary, with due respect with no fear of contradiction, Mr. Idowu’s piece is riddled with logical fallacies:
• False equivalence (comparing different wars, eras, and countries),
• Appeal to emotion (using shame and honour as weapons),
• Cherry-picked anecdotes (ignoring institutional and geopolitical differences),
• and sweeping generalizations (branding all Nigerian generals as ineffective).
We must demand better from our military and political leadership, but not through emotional hysteria and militant nostalgia. A serious national security conversation must be grounded in facts, structure, and sober reflection, not in cheap drama meant for applause.
Brig Gen PTO Aro (Rtd) mni
